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Abstract
Under the Japanese patent system, an applicant has to request exami-
nation within a given period of time after application. This paper studies
the timing of a request for examination when return on patent is uncertain.
When a rm les a patent application, it acquires a timing option limited
for a xed period and can exercise it at anytime. After modeling a real op-
tions model of the request for examination, we estimate it based on micro
patent application data. The paper nds that the request for examination
is deferred when uncertainty increases. We also nd that the probability of
requesting examination rises as the time limit approaches since the option
value declines with time and falls down to zero at the time limit.
JEL classi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1. Introduction
Much attention has been paid to the importance of Intellectual Property Rights in
economic activity. Patent rights are the representing one, and also in Japan patents
has been emphasized. Even if statistically, the number of Japanese patent applications
is highest in the world according to World Intellectual Property Organization Patent
Report 2006. Such a case of the high number of Japanese patent applications is a
frequent issue in the eld of patent management. As one opinion, Pitkethly (1997)
suggests a deferred examination system in Japan; "the system must act at least as
a potential incentive to le patents which in a less exible system might not be led
because they would be less valuable. "
Before describing the system, we illustrate the procedures for obtaining a patent
right in Figure 1. To put it briey, we can whether to le a patent application for new
invention, and then we request examination if we hope the patented invention. A patent
will be granted only after examination as to patentability which may be requested by
the applicant or by a third party.
Therefore, provide further details of the patent system, especially a request for ex-
amination. Under the system, an applicant has to request examination within a given
period of time after ling. Otherwise the patent is deemed to be withdrawn1. With
respect to a given period of time, for the patent applications led on or before Septem-
ber 30, 2001, the time limit of seven years from the ling date is to be applied, and the
above revised time limit is to be applied for patent applications led on or after October
1, 2001. It is the most unique point that Japanese Patent Law allows examination to be
deferred for up to certain xed period while most other countries do not. That is, under
1An applicant does not expect patenting all applications. In fact the proportion of requests for
examination to all applications is half.
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the other patent systems an applicant must decide to continue applications with contin-
ued cost of applications, but under Japanese patent system a continuance procedure is
not needed.
We discuss how rms accounting for 95% of the patent applications perform under
the unique system. As shown in Figure 1, the Japan Patent O¢ ce publish the content
of an application in the O¢ cial Gazette after 18 months have elapsed from the date
of ling2. Therefore, as the rms defend patenting the invention by the rival rms,
they take time and select the protable patent applications slowly and carefully. At the
time of invention, rms can not assess precisely return on patenting because the return
is uncertain. Under the Japanese patent system the rms can decide the timing of a
request for examination with no deferral charge. That is, when the rms le patents,
they acquire timing options limited for a xed period and can exercise in at anytime, or
nite American call option. This paper studies the timing of a request for examination
when return on patent is uncertain using real options approach.
Provided that the concept of viewing patents as options is expressed, Pakes (1986)
presents the value of patents in Europe derived from renewal from data in aspects of
theoretical and empirical study. Pakes (1986) shows that the view of the options repre-
sented by holding a patent is that payment of a renewal fee for a granted patent not only
buys the coming years monopoly prots but also buys in all but the nal year an option
on renewing the patent at the end of the year, exercise price for which is the renewal
fee then payable. The patent renewal model contribute to our study on a request for
examination, but it has the di¤erent points, for example whether an owner has to pay
fee every year is di¤erent. We seek a more suitable model to represent the Japanese
system.
Meanwhile, in Japan the empirical studies have been di¢ cult due to the problem
of utilizing statistical data. However, recently the patent-a¢ liated organizations are
2After the publication of unexamined application, an applicant obtains the right to demand (payment
of ) compensation. Note that the compensation is claimed after a patent right is established.
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promoting the data, for example "Results of the Survey of Intellectual Property-Related
Activities" conducted by Japan Patent O¢ ce, and "The Institute of Intellectual Property
(IIP) patent Database " provided by the IIP. The research reports (published in 2004,
2005) examine the Japanese patent activity empirically using individual data of "Results
of the Survey of Intellectual Property-Related Activities". As mentioned the studies, in
Japan it is expected that empirical study on patent activity will accumulate. In this
paper, after modeling a real options model of request for examination, we estimate it
based on micro patent application data collected from "The IIP patent Database ".
Section 2 provides an overview of the request for examination model used in this
paper. In Section 3, we explain estimation method, or duration analysis. Section 4
describes the data and the descriptive statistics, and then Section 5 shows the results of
both nonparametric estimation and the regression model. Section 6 contains concluding
remarks.
2. Theoretical Model
When we consider requests for examination under the uncertain returns, especially in
Japan, the real options model by Paddock, Siegel and Smith (1988) is useful. The
model is the most popular (or mentioned) model for petroleum real options applications,
and has practical advantages (when compared with others options models) due to its
simplicity and few parameters estimation. It is suitable for the case of the requests for
examination since the option to develop the reserve is not a perpetual one3.That is, the
method is to exploit the power of the analogy with a nancial American call option on a
stock paying a continuously compound dividend yield4. Following Paddock, Siegel and
3O¤shore leases are usually subject to relinquishment requirements, which limit the time that the
rm can hold the tract before developing it.
4An American call option is an asset that gives the holder the right (not the obligation) to buy one
stock for a xed exercise price, until a certain date (expiration ).
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Smith (1988), the close connection between the value of the request for examination and
the call option on stock is illustrated in Table 1.
Moreover, Paddock, Siegel and Smith (1988) consider the valuation and exploitation
of an o¤shore oil tract as a multistage problem: exploration, development, and extrac-
tion. Similarly, in the case of patents, applicants and patentees confront the following
decision types: whether to le a patent application, whether to request examination,
whether to keep any patent granted in force or let it lapse, and how to exploit the patent
one granted (direct commercialization, licensing, a combination or outright sale)5. Dixit
and Pindyck (1994) describe that the solution to the multistage investment problem has
exactly the same form as the solution to the single stage problem, and the only thing
that changes is the amount of the investment; the solution for the rst stage uses the
total investment cost and the solution for the second stage uses the second-stage cost.
Therefore, when we consider the rms decision on requesting examination after ling
of patent applications, the cost includes not only the fee of requesting examination but
also the cost of patenting and the commercialization cost. That is, consider that the
rst stage is a request for examination, and second stage is a patent commercialization.
In particular, we focus on the valuation of waiting the request for examination.
The rms problem is to decide on whether to request examination in consideration
of the following situation. Filing a patent application provides the timing option to
request examination, which is the right to decision-making for patenting the invention
due to acquiring the monopoly prot from the invention in the future. At any time t
up to a given expiration date  , the rm can pay I including the cost of patenting
and the commercialization cost, for which the expected future net cash ows conditional
on undertaking the request have a present value Vt; it represents the appropriately
discounted expected cash ows, given the information available at time t. For the rm,
5Lambrecht (2000) analyzes the sleeping patent phenomenon, which involves the consideration of the
optimal timing of two sequential investment decisions: patenting and commercialization of the product
innovation.
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Vt represents the market value of a claim on the stream of net cash ows that arise
from patenting the inventory. Typically, Vt is stochastic. We assume that Vt follows a
geometric Brownian motion of the form,
dV = V dt+ V dz; (1)
where  is the drift (or growth rate) parameter,  the proportional variance parameter,
and dz the increment of the standard Wiener process.
Given equation (1) for the value of a patent , we can now determine the value of
waiting a request for examination. Let F (V; t) denote the value of waiting the request
for examination. Using equation (1) and going through the usual steps, we can verify
that F (V; t) must satisfy
1
2
2V 2FV V + (r   )V FV + Ft   rF = 0; (2)
where r is the riskless interest rate, and  =     is the dividend rate6. Note that we
do not need to know  or , but only the di¤erence between them, . Equation (2) is a
partial di¤erential equation; since the option to request examination expires at time  ,
the value of the option depends on the current time t.
6We can write equation (2) down immediately by noticing the formal analogy between this partial
di¤erential equation and the one obtained using the dynamic programing approach,
1
2
2V 2FV V + V FV + Ft   F = 0;
where  is a discount rate. In equation (2), the exogenously specied discount rate  is replaced by the
riskless rate r, and the growth rate  of the geometric Brownian motion of V is replaced by (r   ):
In other words, we can evaluate the future payo¤ by discounting it at the riskless rate r, provided we
are willing to pretend that V follows a process with a di¤erent growth rate parameter 0 = r   . We
have here an instance of "equivalent risk-neutral valuation," a procedure with much wider applicability
and interest in nancial economics; See Dixit and Pindyck (1994, Chapter 4 and 5) for the relationship
between dynamic programing and contingent claims valuation.
5
Equation (2) must be solved subject to boundary conditions as following.
F (0; t) = 0; (3)
F (V; ) = max [V   I; 0] ; (4)
F (V ; t) = V    I; (5)
FV (V
; t) = 1: (6)
Condition (4) just says that at expiration, the option will be exercised if V > I.
Equation (2) cannot be solved analytically, but it is not di¢ cult to obtain a solution
numerically using nite di¤erence methods. The numerical solution will help to illustrate
the results and show how they depend on the values of the various parameters. As we
will see, these results are qualitatively the same as those that come out of standard
option pricing models. Table 2 reports the solutions of numerical analysis by case, and
Figure 2.1 to 2.4 show the threshold values.
The Basic Model
The basic model showed by the column 1 in Table 2 and Figure 2.1 is based on the
following parameter values: the total cost I = 1, the prot volatility (or uncertainty)
 = 0:2, the time to expiration  = 7, the riskless interest rate r = 0:04, the dividend
rate  = 0:04. In Table 2, the value of the threshold is higher than the cost, V  > I = 1.
That is, the value is higher than the threshold value in the standard NPV rule, V  =
I = 1. Figure 2.1 shows the threshold value V  as a function of the number as years to
expiration. Note that at expiration, V  = I = 1 which follows from boundary condition
(4), so that the standard NPV rule applies. The threshold declines toward unity as the
expiration approaches since the option value declines with time and falls down to zero
at the time to expiration. In particular, it declines drastically close to the expiration.
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The Case of Larger Uncertainty
The column 2 in Table 2 and Figure 2.2 report the case of lager uncertainty, for  = 0:4.
The uncertainty increases the threshold value V  and the option value F in Table 2.
Therefore, it is di¢ cult for a rm to request examination. Along with these value, the
threshold curve showed by Figure 2.2 is upper than Figure 2.1. Thus, it is known that
the uncertainty increases the value of a rms investment opportunity, but decreases the
amount of actual investing that the rm will do.
The Case of Larger Opportunity Cost
The parameter  plays an important role. If V were the price of a share of common
stock,  would be the dividend rate on the stock. The total expected return on the
stock would be  =  + ; that is, the dividend rate plus the expected rate of capital
gain. If the dividend rate  were zero, a call option on the stock would always be held
to maturity, and never exercised prematurely. The reason is that the entire return on
the stock is captured in its price movements, and hence by the call option, so there is
no cost to keeping the option alive. However, if the dividend rate is positive, there is an
opportunity cost to keeping the option alive rather than exercising it. That opportunity
cost is the dividend stream that one forgoes by holding the option rather than the stock.
Since  is a proportional dividend rate, the higher is the price of the stock, the greater is
the ow of dividends. At some high enough to make it worthwhile to exercise the option.
If  > 0, the expected rate of capital gain on the project  is less than the expected
rate of return from owning the completed project . Hence  is an opportunity cost of
delaying construction of the project, and instead keeping the option to invest alive. If
 were zero, there would be no opportunity cost to keeping the option alive, and one
would never invest, no matter how high the NPV of the project. That is why we assume
 > 0. On the other hand, if  is very large, the value of the option will be very small,
because the opportunity cost of waiting is large. As  !1, the value of the option goes
7
to zero; in e¤ect, the only choices are to invest now or never, and the standard NPV rule
again applies. In the case of a request for examination, there could be an opportunity
cost to delay the request. Since the deferred request for examination leads to take a
long time to grant a patent from the ling date, in the meantime a rm might let the
opportunity of prots go to waste and also period of patent right is shorter7. Thus, the
patent applications with the large opportunity cost, including the shorter life cycle of a
technology, should be requested immediately, while others with small opportunity cost,
including the defensive patent applications, should be held until close to the time limit
for requesting examination.
The column 3 in Table 2 and Figure 2.3 show the case of a larger opportunity cost,
for  = 0:08. When the opportunity cost is large, the threshold value and the option
value are lower than the basic model, that is, a rm requests examination at an earlier
date.
The Case of Shorter Expiration Date
As we saw in section 1, the time limit for submitting a request for examination for a
patent application is to be changed as of October 1, 2001 from "within seven years"
from the ling date to "within three years" from the ling date. In response to this, the
patent applications waiting the examination at Patent O¢ ce jump. We can examine
such a revision using our model, and show in column 4 in Table 2 and Figure 2.4, for
 = 3. As compared with seven years, or the basic model, the threshold value and
the option value slightly decrease. It is implied that such revision promotes requesting
examination, therefore, raises the number of requests for examination.
7The term of patent is 20 years from the ling date. Note that there is no case of patenting by the
third party after ling.
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3. Estimation Method
In the previous section, we capture requesting examination as exercising the call option,
and show how to decide the timing of it under uncertainty when a rm is allowed
examination to be deferred for up to certain xed period. In this section, we briey
describe duration analysis ,which use models of the length of time spent in a given state
before transition to another state, such as duration unemployed or alive or without health
insurance. Considering such econometric models, the problem is that the distributions
for time to an event might be quite dissimilar from the normal. Then, we should use
the methods substituting a more reasonable distributional assumption, called parametric
models, or relaxing the specication of the model, called semiparametric models.
We begin with explaining the basic concepts. Now consider that a patent application
has not yet requested examination for T periods. Duration T is nonnegative random
variable and has the cumulative distribution function F (t) and the density function
f(t) = dF (t)=dt. Then, the probability that the duration is less than t is
F (t) = Pr[T  t] =
Z t
0
f(s)ds: (7)
A complementary concept to the cdf is the probability that the duration exceeds t,
called the survivor function, which is dened by S(t) = Pr[T > t] = 1   F (t) . A key
concept is the hazard rate (or function), which is the instantaneous probability of leaving
a state conditional on survival to time t. This is dened as
(t) = lim
t!0
Pr[t  T < t+tjT  t]
t
=
f(t)
S(t)
: (8)
We can obtain estimators of the survivor and the hazard function by using nonpara-
metric analysis. Let t1 < t2 <    < tj <    tJ denote the observed discrete failure times
of the spells in a sample of size N; N  J . We dene it as follows,
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dj = the number of spells ending at time tj ; (9)
mj = the number of spells censored in [tj ; tj+1);
rj = the number of spells at risk at time tj  =
X
ljlj
(dl +ml) ;
where "at time tj " means "just before time tj ." In this paper, tj is a period from a ling
date to a requesting date or a censoring date, N is the number of patent applications, dj
is the number of patent application requesting examination at time tj , rj is the number
of patent applications which still have deferred requests for examination at time tj  .
Since j = Pr [T = tj jT  tj ], an estimator of the hazard function is the number of
spells ending at time tj divided by the number of spells at risk at time tj , or b = dj=rj .
The Kaplan-Meier estimator or product limit estimator of the survivor function is the
sample analogue, bS = Y
jjtjt

1  bj = Y
jjtjt
rj   dj
rj
: (10)
In section5.1, we report this estimator based on our data set.
On the other hand, usually in econometric models we are interested in hazard func-
tions conditional on a set of covariates or regressors. Perhaps the most widely used
formulation used in regression analysis of durations is the proportional hazard model. A
proportional hazard can be written as
(tjx) = 0(t;)(x;) (11)
where (x;) > 0 is a nonnegative function of x, which is a vector of covariates, and
0(t;) > 0 is called the baseline hazard. In addition,  and  are vectors of parameters.
The baseline hazard is common to all individuals in the population and is a function
of t alone. The individual hazard function di¤ers proportionately based on a function
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(x;) of the observed covariates.
Furthermore, we can classify the methods of duration analysis into two groups. In
parametric models an appropriate hazard function is specied, such as the exponen-
tial or Weibull distribution. We should use the distribution with due consideration for
characteristics of our duration data.
Such fully parametric models are relatively simple to estimate but produce inconsis-
tent parameter estimates if any part of the parametric model is misspecied. Fortunately,
there is a semiparametric method that requires less than complete distributional speci-
cation because the baseline hazard is no particular parametrization and, in fact, is left
unestimated. The model makes no assumptions about the shape of the hazard over time.
This is called the Cox proportional hazards model. To keep the distribution of duration
data exible, we adopt the Cox proportional hazards model.
Following Cameron and Trivedi(2005, Chapter 20), we mention the Cox proportional
hazards model along the analysis in this paper. The proportional hazard denotes
(tjx) = 0(t) exp(x0): (12)
This replaces (x;) with exp(x0) in the general form (5). That is, This model is
considered, with the functional form for 0(t; ) unspecied and the functional form for
(x;) fully specied. Suppose the kth regressor xk increases by one unit and other
regressors are unchanged. The change in the hazard is 1   exp(k) times the original
hazard then.
To estimate  in the proportional hazard model, we set up a partial likelihood
function. Let t1 < t2 <    < tj <    < tJ denote the observed discrete failure
times of the spells in a sample of size N , N  J . Additionally, we dene to be the set
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as follow.
R(tj) = fl : tl  tjg = set of spells at risk at tj (13)
D(tj) = fl : tl = tjg = set of spells completed at tj
dj =
X
l
1 (tl = tj) = number of spells completed at tj :
Now consider the probability of requesting examination at time tj . Then
Pr [Tj = tj jR (tj)] = Pr [Tj = tj jTj  tj ]P
l2R(tj) Pr [Tl = tljTl  tj ]
(14)
=
j (tj jxj)P
l2R(tj) l (tj jxl)
=
 (xj ;)P
l2R(tj)  (xl;)
where in the last line the baseline hazard factor 0(tj) has dropped out, as a consequence
of the proportional hazard assumption, (t) = .
Furthermore, we should modify a partial likelihood function on the basis of equation
(14) so that it adapts to three characteristics of our data described in next section.
First, we should control for tied durations. If there is more than one failure at a given
time, an adjustment is needed. It is possible that multiple patent applications request
examinations at the same time. Then, the partial log-likelihood function denote
lnL () =
kX
j=1
24 X
m2D(tj)
ln(xm;)  dj ln
0@ X
l2R(tj)
(xl;)
1A35 : (15)
Second, our data have right censoring data described in detail in next section, and
until they are censored a¤ect the size of the risk set, or the second in (15). Then, we
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should rewrite it as
lnL () =
NX
i=1
i
24ln(xi;)  ln
0@ X
l2R(tj)
(xl;)
1A35 (16)
where the indicator variables i = 1 for uncensored observation and equal zero otherwise.
Third, this paper focuses on the point what kind of technology is. We therefore
allow the baseline hazards to di¤er by technical classication, but the coe¢ cients  are
constrained to be the same8. This method is called stratied estimation. The hazard
function for technical classication gth denotes g(t) exp (x0) ; g = 1; : : : ; 8. Then, the
partial log-likelihood function is
lnL() =
8X
g=1
lnLg(): (17)
Using the equation (17), we perform maximum likelihood estimation.
4. Data
We use rich data set to study the timing of the request for examination under unique
Japanese patent system. The data set link Japanese rm-level data to patent data, that
is, each observation has not only the information about a patent application but also
the applicants, or rms characteristics. We collect patent data from the Institute of
Intellectual Property (IIP) Patent Database (DB) provided by Institute of Intellectual
Property, and rm-level data from NEEDS nancial database. We describe a making
method of our data set as follows.
To begin with, we describe a outline of IIP patent DB. The DB is developed for
patent statistics analysis based on arrangement standardization data, and covers the
8We classify the pantent applications according to International Patent Classication. 1.Human
Necessities, 2.Performing Operations; Transporting, 3.Chemistry; Metallurgy, 4.Textiles; Paper, 5.Fixed
Constructions, 6.Mechanical Engineering ;Lighting; Heating; Weapons; Blasting, 7.Physics, 8.Electricity.
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observations which have been published the contents of applications or registered by
January, 2004 from January, 1964. It consists of the following ve data les; Application
File, Registration File, Applicant File, Patent Holder File, and Citation File9. In this
paper, we use Application File and Applicant File, which are connected with the appli-
cant number. Then, we obtain the information about the date of ling and requesting,
the International Patent Classication, and the applicants name.
From NEEDS nancial database, we extract the manufacturing rms which published
the nancial data from 1990 to 2005. By matching the rms name including NEEDS
database and the applicants name recorded on IIP patent DB, we can make the rich
data set including the patent data and the rm-level data10.
Here we consider a revision of the time limit for submitting a request for examination.
The time limit, which represents the time to expiration in section 2, is to be changed
as of October 1, 2001 from "within seven years" from the ling date to "within three
years" from the ling date. To avoid a problem with having two limits, we use the data
which were led from April 1, 1990 to September 30, 2001.
In this study, dependent variables are the durations which are the days from the ling
date to requesting date. As described in the previous section, we should identify the two
kinds of right censored data. One is the data of the application which has not been
requested within a period of seven years from ling date. That is, it is the withdrawn
one. The following reasons are thought; the business or right hopeless, or a defensive
application. The other is the data which are right censored at a data collection time
before the time limit for submitting a request for examination. In this study, we set the
data collection time of November 20, 2003, on which we can observe the latest sample.
As discussed in the previous section, the empirical model is appropriate for censored
data.
9Goto and Motohashi (2005) gives a complete description of IIP patent DB.
10 In matching of an applicantname and a rms name, we are careful to the following points. We
accommodate a di¤erence of rms name notation and a change of a rms name. However, a merger
and holding company are removed from our sample.
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Using our data set, Figure 3 provides the number of applications and the rate of
requests for examination, which denotes the number of requests for examination divided
by the number of applications11. Electrical Machinery and Precision Instruments have
the large number of applications, but lower value in terms of the rate of requests for
examination. Due to constantly advancing technology elds in such high-tech indus-
tries, they might not make a former application a patent if a more valuable technology
invent after ling. Thus, the performance of applications and requests for examination
is implied technical characteristics by industry.
In this paper, we suggest one explanation for the timing of a request for examination
when returns on patents are uncertain. In section 2 we present the theoretical model,
and show that the higher uncertainty of returns is, the more di¢ cult it is to request
examination. To analyze evidence empirically, we use the standard deviation of the
growth rate of real sales within the duration as the uncertainty measure12. In terms of
predictions in the theoretical model, it has the negative e¤ect on the hazard rate which
denotes the probability of requesting examination.
Besides the implications from our model, we investigate the e¤ect of the average of
the real sales growth rate within the duration. We consider that in the growth stage a
rm requests examination actively because of making the patent strategy with an eye
to the future. Therefore, it is expected that the higher growth rate rms perform, the
shorter the duration is, that is positive e¤ect of the hazard rate.
In addition, we show whether the number of employees has the e¤ect on the hazard
11We calculate the rate of requesting examination in Figure 3 using the observation having expired by
the collection date, or before November 20,1996. If we use the total observations, the rate is underesti-
mated because of including the observations before the time limit.
12As discussed even by Pitkehly (1997), it is di¢ clut to assess the value of individual patents. For
example, Pakes (1986) estimates the value of patents in Europe using the patent renewal model. There-
fore, we face the problem of measuring the uncertainty of patent value. However, we cannot use the
information after requesting because the feedback from the duration to the future value of the covariate
violates strictly exogenous. In this paper, we asssume that a rm calculates the prot ow from a patent
technology based on the performance of itself when decides a request for examination. Then, leaving it
as a subject of future investigation, we use tthe standard deviation of the growth rate of real sales as the
proxy of the uncertainty. The measure basically follows that of Ogawa and Suzuki (2000), except that
the empirical study shows capital investment under uncertainty.
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rate. This hypothesis is basically followed by Nagaoka and Nishimura (2005), who esti-
mate the patent acquisition function and the patent use function using Japanese patent
data. Although the size of complementary assets increases the number of application,
the rate of requesting examination decreases, because of including the lower quality or
unpatentable applications. We predict the negative e¤ect on the hazard rate. As for the
rest, some kind of dummy variables are provided. One is the technical dummy due to
controlling the technical characteristics of applications. We take in 527 dummy variables
based on International Patent Classication. The others are industrial dummy variables
and ling year dummy variables which control the situation associated with economic
and patents.
In duration analysis, the regressors contain the time-invariant covariates which de-
note the vector of regressors at time t and the time-varying covariates which denote the
covariate path up through time t13. In this study, all dummy variables are clearly time-
invariant covariates because they do not take di¤erent values over the duration. On the
other hand, sales and the number of employments are observed each scal period, but
we can consider them as time-variant covariates by transforming into the average and
the standard deviation, that is, we look on their measures as the constant performance
of the rm over the duration. In fact Cameron and Trivedi (2005) describe using the
average over the duration as the easy method to deal with time-varying covariates by
some software.
Table 3 and Table 4 show descriptive statistics and correlation coe¢ cients, respec-
tively.
13We can obtain the data after a request for examination from Registration File in IIP patent DB.
However, they may exihibit feedback so that patent registration is involved in whether it requests ex-
amination or not. Lancaster (1990) provideds a denition that rules out feedback from the duration to
future values of the covariates. Therefore the information on registration is not appropriate as covariates.
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5. Results
5.1. Fact Finding
Figure 4 shows the rate of requests for examination by ling year, which denotes the
number of requests for examination divided by the number of applications. Although
in the rst year it is little high 8%, after that decreases, just before time limit rises
again. That is, the rate of request for examination draws the U-curve14. Such a unique
situation might imply the Japanese system of request for examination.
The rise in the latter half is corresponding to the discussion in section 2; the number
of requesting examination increases as the time limit approaches since the option value
declines with time and falls down to zero at the time limit.
Furthermore, the high rate in the rst year suggests the two factors. One is the value
of the valuable patent is requested immediately. Pakes (1986) shows that there are a
few highly valuable patents and many relatively worthless ones since the distribution
of the potential returns skews towards as the patent ages. The other is that the high
opportunity cost leads to request examination at once. Since we cannot identify the two
factors, we need to undertake an additional analysis forward15.
5.2. Nonparametric Estimation
Using the data of duration including censoring data, in Figure 5 we present the Kaplan-
Meier estimator of survival function by industry. As the denition is showed in section
3, it provides the probability not requesting examination at the time. No regressors
14Note that such a curve is the nding by data of the Japan Patent O¢ ce Annual Report. Our data
set cannot capture the curve, although the rate rises as time passes.
15We make table of it.
Value of patent Opportunity cost Request for examination
High High Immediate
High Low Immediate
Low High Immediate
Low Low Deferred
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are included. The estimator is often insightful to know the shape of the raw hazard
or survival function before considering introducing regressors. In addition, it is not
corresponding to the rate of requesting examination in Figure 4, because denominators
are di¤erent. The denominator of the rate is total number of applications, on the other
hand, the estimator uses survival number of application at the time. That is, the rate is
unconditional probability, and the estimator is conditional probability. Then, we should
be careful to interpret the estimator.
Figure 4 shows that the estimator of the survivor decreases drastically over 7 years, or
from 2191 days to 2557 days. To defend entry of other rms, a rm gets a large number
of complement patents to encircle core patents. In such a case, representing the low
opportunity cost, the rm is not always have to patent immediately, therefore requests
for examination have been deferred until the time limit for requesting examination, that
is, until the option value lowers enough.
5.3. Decision of timing to request examination
We report estimation results based on the Cox proportional hazard model described in
section 3, using a 5% random sample of total population of our data set. Table 5 shows
two estimation results. First, in the non-stratied estimation we assume that all patent
applications have the same baseline hazard. Uncertainty, growth rate, and number of
employees coe¢ cients are signicant at 5%, which are consistent with our view. However,
we cannot pass the specication tests of the proportional hazards assumption that the
coe¢ cients are constant over time, H0 : (t) = . The test statistic using Schoenfeld
residuals by Grambsch and Terneau (1994) is reported in the last row of Table 5. As a
result of it, we nd the specication problem, and it suggests that the proportional hazard
assumption is violated for some covariate. In such cases, it may be possible to stratify
on that variable and employ the proportional hazard model within each group (or called
stratum) for the other covariates. Figure 5 represents the baseline cumulative hazard
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function under the assumption that all observations face the same baseline hazard16. It
is very restricted.
As discussed in section 3, in the stratied estimation the individuals in the gth
group have an arbitrary baseline hazard function. And so, the baseline hazards are
allowed to di¤er by technical classication based on International Patent Classication;
g = 1;    ; 8. The coe¢ cients are constrained to be the same. The estimation results
reported by Table 5 are signicant at 5%. Moreover, the coe¢ cient estimators do not
change as such non stratied estimation results. Cleves et al. (2004) recommend that
the proportional hazards assumption be checked separately for each group. In Table
6 the specication tests of the proportional hazards assumption are passed except for
"Physics".
In the result for the stratied estimation, we interpret the e¤ects on the probability
of requesting examination. The uncertainty increases the probability, then it is implied
that a rm with larger uncertainty for project returns delays a request for examination,
and it is consistent with the theoretical implication. For example, in the rm that the
uncertainty is 0.1 points larger, the probability of requesting examination falls by 16.7%
at any given point in time. The growth rate coe¢ cient is positive, meaning that growing
rms tend to promote requesting examination, and also as for the number of employee,
we nd that in the rm with larger complementary assets the probability of requesting
examination is lower.
As another meaningful point described in section 2, we want to examine that the
hazard, that is, the probability of the requesting examination is increasing over time
since the threshold declines as the expiration approaches, especially close to the expi-
ration. The cumulative hazard does appear to be increasing and at an increasing rate,
meaning that the hazard itself is increasing (recall that the hazards is the derivative of
16Although the Cox model produces no direct estimate of the baseline hazard, estimates of functions
related to 0(t) can be obtained after the fact, conditional on the estimates of  from the Cox model.
One of them is the estimates of the baseline cumulative hazard.
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the cumulative hazard). Then, we should examine the estimate of the baseline cumula-
tive hazard because the baseline hazard is a function of time alone, that is corresponds
to the overall hazard when x = 0. Figure 6 represents the estimates of the baseline
cumulative hazard by technical classication. Unlike the rate of requesting examination
in Figure 4 and the estimator of Kaplan-Meier in Figure 5, calculating the functions
by technical classication, we can show the results taking into accounts the di¤erence
of the opportunity cost to some extent. We nd that the probability of the requesting
examination is increasing over time since the curves appear that they have the convex
functions. In particular, the estimates explode cross over 2000 days, and then it should
be showed that the option value declines with time and option value falls down to zero at
the time limit. Between technical classication the order of the estimator di¤ers vastly,
In Electricity, Human necessities and Textiles; Paper, we can consider that the proba-
bility of requesting examination depend on time largely because the baseline hazard is
a function of time alone.
6. Conclusion
In this paper, we have examined the timing of a request for examination under Japanese
unique patent system both theoretically and empirically. We can explain the rms
decision taking into account a deferred examination system in Japan by the timing
option with the dividend and the time to expiration. Our model shows that 1) the
number of requests for examination increases as the expiration approaches since the
option value declines with time and falls down to zero at the time to expiration, 2) the
large uncertainty leads to defer requesting examination, 3) with the high opportunity
cost a rm request examination immediately.
Using the rich data matching patents and rm-level data, we nd empirical evidence
supportive of predictions in respect of declining the option value over time and the
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uncertainty. Note that as far as the opportunity cost concerned, we cannot identify the
e¤ect on requesting examination empirically.
As the results of this study, it is implied that a rm decides to request examination in
consideration of the timing option. Therefore, we should provide the evidence that the
unique system of requesting examination in Japan causes the high number of Japanese
patent applications, "le a patent application in the meantime", since it generates a
valuable option.
There are several future directions to take this study. First, we must nd the measure
of uncertainty of individual patent value. Second, we show the e¤ect of opportunity cost
empirically.
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FIGURE 1 
 
    Source: "Procedures for Obtaining a Patent Right," by Japan Patent Office. 
    http://www.jpo.go.jp/tetuzuki_e/index.htm
Note: To the patent applications filed before September 30, 2001, the time limit of 
seven years from the filing date is to be applied. 
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TABLE 1 
Comparison of a call option with a delayed request for examination 
Call option on stock Delayed request for examination 
Current value of stock (Gross) PV of expected cash flow creating patent 
Exercise price Cost, including fee for requesting examination 
Time to expiration Time limit for requesting examination 
Stock value uncertainty Patent value uncertainty 
Dividend on stock Net production revenue from patent less depreciation 
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TABLE 2 
Parameters and Numerical Solutions for Four Cases 
Column No. 1 2 3 4
Basic Larger uncertainty
Larger dividend
rate, or
opportunity cost
Shorter expiration
date
1.Parameter
The present value (at current date) of
the operating project V 1.2
The present value (at current date) of
the investment cost (net of tax credits) I 1
The volatility of the project V ' or a
market variable as a proxy of  the σ 0.2 0.4
The time to expiration of the rights of
investment τ 7 3
The riskless interest rate (real and
after-tax) r 0.04
The dividend yield of V (or
convenience yield from the commodity) δ 0.04 0.08
2.Numerical solution
The value of the threshold (level of
optimal immediate investment) V* 1.653 2.473 1.337 1.5
The value of the option to invest (or
the value of the investment F 0.292 0.462 0.223 0.252
Threshold value × Time Figure 2.1 Figure 2.2 Figure 2.3 Figure 2.4
Note: We find the solutions using the shareware file for real options analysis provided by Marco A.G. Dias.  
See http://www.puc-rio.br/marco.ind/main.html#contents
. 
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FIGURE 2.1 
Threshold Value over Time: part 1 
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Note: The value is based on the basic case, Column 1 in Table 2. 
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FIGURE 2.2 
Threshold Value over Time: part 2 
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Note: The value is based on the larger uncertainty case, Column 2 in Table 2. 
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FIGURE 2.3 
Threshold Value over Time: part 3 
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Note: The value is based on the larger dividend rate case, Column 3 in Table 2. 
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FIGURE 2.4 
Threshold Value over Time: part 4 
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Note: The value is based on the shorter expiration date case, Column 4 in Table 2. 
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FIGURE 3 
Number of applications (per Firm) and Rate of Examination Requests 
0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
3000
3500
F
o
o
d
(
4
5
)
T
e
x
t
i
l
e
(
1
5
)
P
u
l
p
 
a
n
d
 
P
a
p
e
r
(
8
)
C
h
e
m
i
c
a
l
(
8
3
)
P
e
t
r
o
l
e
u
m
 
a
n
d
C
o
a
l
 
P
r
o
d
u
c
t
s
(
2
)
C
e
r
a
m
i
c
(
1
7
)
I
r
o
n
 
a
n
d
 
S
t
e
e
l
(
1
4
)
N
o
n
-
F
e
r
r
o
u
s
M
e
t
a
l
s
(
2
3
)
M
e
t
a
l
P
r
o
d
u
c
t
s
(
2
5
)
G
e
n
e
r
a
l
M
a
c
h
i
n
e
r
y
(
7
7
)
E
l
e
c
t
r
i
c
a
l
M
a
c
h
i
n
e
r
y
(
9
7
)
T
r
a
n
s
p
o
r
t
a
t
i
o
n
E
q
u
i
p
m
e
n
t
(
3
7
)
P
r
e
c
i
s
i
o
n
I
n
s
t
r
u
m
e
n
t
(
2
0
)
0.0%
10.0%
20.0%
30.0%
40.0%
50.0%
60.0%
70.0%
80.0%
Number of applications per firm Rate of examination requests
 
Note: The figure is based on a part of data set in this paper, specifically having expired by the collection date; the observations of before 
November 20, 1996. The rate of examination requests is the number of examination requests divided by the total number of 
applications. The values in parentheses are number of the firms. Total number of application, examination requests, and firms is 
588,496 and 273,471, and 463. Then average of application and rate is 1271, and 46.5%.  
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TABLE 3 
Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Mean
Standard
deviation Minimum Maximum
Duration 1918.193 663.330 1 2557
Uncertainty 0.084 0.053 0.000 1.090
Growth Rate 0.035 0.055 -1.517 0.608
No. Employees (log) 9.288 1.238 1.989 11.222  
 
TABLE 4 
Coefficient Correlation 
Variable Uncertainty Growth Rate
No. Employees
(log)
Uncertainty 1
Growth Rate 0.024 1
No. Employees (log) -0.269 0.235 1  
 
 
FIGURE 4 
Rate of Examination Requests  
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Note: “1996”, ”1997” and ”1998” show the rates of requesting examination by application 
year, respectively. These data are obtained from the Japan Patent Office Annual Report 
2006 (Statistical data). On the other hand, “Dataset” is calculated using a part of data 
set in this paper, specifically having expired by the collection date; the observations of 
before November 20, 1996. The rate of requesting examination is the number of 
requesting examination divided by the total number of applications. 
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FIGURE 5 
Kaplan-Meier Survival Estimates by Industry 
0
.
0
0
0
.
2
5
0
.
5
0
0
.
7
5
1
.
0
0
0 500 1000 1500 2000 2500
Time (Days)
Food(5013) Textile(3842)
Pulp and paper(2931) Chemical(60038)
Petroleum and coal products(380) Ceramic(7904)
Iron and steel(25199) Non-ferrous metals(27188)
Metal products(5102) General machinery(42941)
Electrical machinery(311949) Transportation equipment(39348)
Precision instruments(59028)
 
Note: Number of observations is 588,496 , with 273,471 of requesting examinations. Note that we limit the sample period until 
November 20, 1997 in consideration of censoring at the collection date, as in Figure 3 and 4. Values in parentheses are number of 
observations. 
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TABLE 5 
Determinants of Requesting Examination 
  Non stratified estimation Stratified estimation 
Variable Coefficient Standard error exp(0.1*β)-1 Coefficient Standard error exp(0.1*β)-1
Uncertainty -1.747*** 0.205 -0.160 -1.831*** 0.207 -0.167 
Growth rate 0.595** 0.231 0.061 0.541** 0.232 0.056 
No. Employees  -0.052*** 0.008 -0.005 -0.053*** 0.008 -0.005 
Observations（Exits） 49755(19637) 49755(19637) 
Log likelihood -200727.05 -167015.41 
Global test of proportionality over 
all covariates:Χ2
3023.75*** Table 6 
 
Note: Hetroskedasticitic-consistent standard errors. *, **, *** denote significant at the 10%, 5%,and 1% levels, respectively. The 
dummy of industry, application year, and technology are dropped. The degree of freedom for the specification test is 552. 
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TABLE 6 
Specification Test; in Stratified Estimation 
  
Human 
necessities 
 Performing 
operations; 
Transporting
Chemistry; 
Metallurgy 
Textiles; 
Paper 
Fixed 
Constructions
Mechanical; 
et al. 
Physics Electricity 
Global test of proportionality 
over all covariates:Χ2 
139.99 273.39 216.2 35.22 43.37 144.71 671.95*** 391.23
  
Note: *, **, *** denote significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. The dummy of industry, application year, and technology 
are dropped. The degree of freedom for the specification test is 552. 
 
34
FIGURE 6 
Estimated baseline cumulative hazard: Non-stratified estimation 
0
2.000e-23
4.000e-23
6.000e-23
8.000e-23
1.000e-22
c
u
m
u
l
a
t
i
v
e
 
b
a
s
e
l
i
n
e
 
h
a
z
a
r
d
0 500 1000 1500 2000 2500
Time
All (49755 )
 
Note: Values in parentheses are number of observations. 
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FIGURE 7 
Estimated baseline cumulative hazard: Stratified estimation 
0
5.000e-11
1.000e-10
1.500e-10
2.000e-10
0
20
40
60
0
5.000e-10
1.000e-09
1.500e-09
0
10
20
30
40
0
5.000e-08
1.000e-07
1.500e-07
0
2.000e-08
4.000e-08
6.000e-08
8.000e-08
0
5.000e-11
1.000e-10
0
.005
.01
.015
.02
0 1000 2000 3000 0 1000 2000 3000
Chemistry;Metallurgy(5283) Electricity(13870)
Fixed constructions(1008) Human necessities(1761)
Mechanical engineering; et al.(3604) Performing operations; et al. (8748)
Physics(15016) Textiles;Paper(465)
Time
Graphs by name
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